



AIRPOWER STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

**AO5520 SYLLABUS
AY 26**

**JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL
COURSE**

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE**

21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AFB, AL**

9 September 2025

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AFB, AL**

FOREWORD

This Airpower Strategy and Operations course syllabus for the Air Command and Staff College, October-December 2025, provides an overview of the course narrative and objectives, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist reading and preparing for seminar. Included herein is information about the course's methods of evaluation, schedule, and fulfillment of joint professional military education core goals.

Airpower represents one of the greatest opportunities and challenges of modern times. How we approach that challenge is now in your hands.

//SIGNED//

Jordan R. Hayworth, PhD
Course Director
Airpower Strategy and Operations

//SIGNED//

Dr. Edwin H. Redman
Dean of Education

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AIRPOWER STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Airpower Strategy and Operations examines the emergence and evolution of airpower from World War I to the present, exploring how air warfare has evolved across time. Through the lens of strategic competition and great power conflict, the course analyzes key ideas, capabilities, limitations, organizations, and practices that shaped air warfare and air forces in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Students will explore how airmen innovated and adapted in the air domain, drawing lessons that continue to inform debates about airpower's purpose and effectiveness.

The devastating costs of great power wars led military leaders to seek swift, decisive victories. World War I's stalemate and attrition intensified the desire to avoid further pyrrhic warfare. Airpower captivated civilian and military leaders by offering the potential to destroy enemy forces and strike the adversary's home front. It was in this context of total war that airpower emerged.

World War II reinforced belief in airpower's decisive potential among American airmen. That conviction—and the emphasis on pre-war preparation—shaped the identity of the newly independent US Air Force in 1947. During the Cold War, airmen relied on both conventional and nuclear airpower to deter the Soviet Union or to win decisively if deterrence failed.

The experience of limited wars in Korea and Vietnam forced adaptation of an air force that had been developed for total war. Despite battlefield success and notable campaigns involving strategic attack and air interdiction, the USAF—and American airpower more broadly—struggled to achieve strategic goals, casting doubt on airpower's potential decisiveness in such conflicts.

Following Vietnam, the US military transformed itself to prepare for possible high-end conflict against the Soviet Union. Leaders developed new doctrine, training, and technology to overcome limitations presented in Korea and Vietnam. This transformation extended to airpower as a key enabler of strategic advantage. The end of the Cold War seemed to validate this approach, with a decisive success in Operation DESERT STORM (1991) and a possible victory through airpower alone in Operation ALLIED FORCE (1999).

The September 11 terrorist attacks did not shake American confidence in military power. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM began with bold, innovative air campaigns, but protracted insurgencies exposed persistent limitations in airpower's ability to achieve decisive victory in irregular wars. Conversely, airpower played a central role in defeating ISIS during Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

Today, airpower faces a complex future. Land and sea power remain vital, while space, cyber, and information grow in importance. Adversaries have adapted to challenge US air superiority, prompting ongoing debate about air denial strategies and a more limited focus on the "air littoral." Through rigorous study and discussion, students will examine the historical and contemporary development of airpower. Students will be steeped in the history and implications of major air campaigns and will analyze multiple airpower theories and models of employment. The course better prepares students to integrate airpower into joint, all-domain operations and to solve problems

at the operational level of war. Readings, lectures, problem-based learning, and seminar discussion will cultivate critical thinkers capable of leading in complex and uncertain environments. Students will conduct research aimed at understanding airpower's role in the emerging environment, offering ideas and solutions that will optimize airpower for deterrence and warfighting advantage.

COURSE PHASES

The course follows the chronological development of airpower in two phases:


Phase One: Learning from Airpower's Emergence (Days 1–8)

This phase begins with World War I—the first major conflict to feature large-scale airpower. It then examines how different nations responded to the lessons of that war and prepared for future conflicts. The course explores airpower's evolving role in World War II across multiple theaters and assesses its initial employment during the early Cold War with the emergence of nuclear weapons and limited wars.

Phase Two: Confronting Challenges in Airpower's Recent Past, Present, and Future (Days 9–16)

The basic problem of translating increasingly advanced airpower capabilities into meaningful strategic success in irregular and limited conflicts confronted the US Air Force in Vietnam and has remained an enduring challenge. Following the Vietnam War, the US military began a major transformation to enhance capability. This phase traces key advancements in airpower while addressing persistent limitations in modern air warfare. It concludes with an analysis of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and current debates over the future of air superiority.

COURSE MAP



COURSE OBJECTIVES

- 1) Analyze key lessons from airpower history that could inform airpower strategies and plans in the emerging strategic and operational environment.
- 2) Analyze airpower concepts and capabilities in historical and contemporary perspectives.
- 3) Apply airpower history, theory, doctrine, and strategy to overcome challenges at the operational level of war.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Students will find detailed instructions, to include policies for AI usage, for the below assignments on Canvas.

AO-600 (E): AIRPOWER RESEARCH TERM PAPER PROSPECTUS

Deliverable: Students will submit a short research prospectus that identifies a research topic, tentative thesis statement and main points, and overview of sources and research methodology. The prospectus should clearly relate to one of the approved prompts listed below for AO-601 (E): AIRPOWER RESEARCH TERM PAPER. This is a Pass/Fail assignment. Students who receive a

Fail grade will have one week from the date of return to revise and resubmit their prospectus for instructor approval. Once the prospectus is completed, significant modification requires instructor review and approval.

AO-601 (E): AIRPOWER RESEARCH TERM PAPER

Deliverable: Students will write a research paper of 2,500-3,000 words, excluding end notes, on one of the following prompts. This assignment will count for 35 percent of the final course grade.

Prompt A: How can knowledge of airpower history, theory, and/or doctrine contribute to solving a key operational or strategic challenge confronting airpower in the twenty-first century? In crafting your response, draw upon relevant lessons or concepts from the AO curriculum and incorporate material covered in the MT, JO, LP, and NS courses, as appropriate. You are also encouraged to support your argument with outside research.

Prompt B: Many leaders question how airpower theory, strategy, and operations must evolve. Create or adapt an airpower theory to best achieve strategic effect in the current competitive security environment. Alternatively, construct and support an argument that existing airpower theories remain sufficient. In addition to AO course material and outside research, your response should draw upon course content covered in MT, JO, LP, and NS courses, as appropriate.

AO-602 (E): END-OF-COURSE ESSAY

Deliverable: This in-class, closed-book, closed-notes essay requires students to demonstrate their understanding of airpower history, theory, and doctrine, as well as their ability to apply these concepts. The assignment will account for 35 percent of the final course grade.

Prompt: The End-of-Course Essay prompt will be issued to students at the start of the examination period.

AO-603 (E): AIRPOWER “STAFF RIDE” PRESENTATION

Students will give an in-class presentation of eight to twelve minutes on a topic that will be assigned in class on Day 1. Presentations should use visual aids as appropriate. Students will be given a preparation guide for these presentations. They should be prepared to answer questions and lead a discussion on their topic with the instructor and other students during and following their presentation. This assignment will be worth 15 percent of the final course grade.

AO-604 (E): FINAL CLASS CONTRIBUTION

Students are expected to attend all scheduled sessions, individually read the assigned pages, participate in class applications, and meaningfully contribute to seminars. This contribution is worth 15 percent of the course grade. This grade evaluates class contribution in the course from Day 1 through day 16. Instructors will provide each student with initial feedback on their contributions in writing by Day 9 of the course.

COURSE MATERIALS

The course includes readings from books issued by ACSC, as well as electronic readings from various sources (indicated as “[EL]”). Students can access the syllabus, and other supplemental materials online through Canvas and Teams. Electronic readings are linked in the syllabus. ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned upon the

conclusion of the course:

- Biddle, Tami Davis. *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.
- Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- Crane, Conrad. *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2020.
- ———. *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016.
- Gordon, Michael, and Bernard Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. New York: Back Bay Books, 1995.
- Griffith, Thomas E. *MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
- Lambeth, Benjamin. *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.
- Laslie, Brian D. *The Air Force Way of War: US Tactics and Training after Vietnam*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.
- Nutter, Ralph H. *With the Possum and the Eagle: The Memoir of a Navigator's War over Germany and Japan*. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2005.
- O'Brien, Philip Payson. *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Olsen, John Andreas, ed. *A History of Air Warfare*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010.
- ———, ed. *Airpower Applied: US, NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017.
- ———, ed. *Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015.
- Overy, Richard. *The Battle of Britain: The Myth and Reality*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.
- Pape, Robert. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Weaver, Michael. *The Air War in Vietnam*. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2022.

Please refer any general questions to:

Dr. Jordan R. Hayworth, Course Director, jordan.hayworth@au.af.edu, Office 194

Lt Col Andrew Roberts, Deputy Course Director, andrew.roberts.14@au.af.edu, Office 193D

Lt Col Dominic Gaskin, Deputy Course Director, dominic.gaskin@au.af.edu, Office 118

Lt Col Sean Mulligan, Deputy Course Director, sean.mulligan@au.af.edu, Office 129A

Lt Col Daniele Lins, Deputy Course Director, daniele.lins.br@au.af.edu, Office 185

***Please refer questions regarding Teams or Canvas content to: Lt Col Daniele Lins, Deputy Course Director, daniele.lins.br@au.af.edu, Office 185

AIRPOWER STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Phase I: Learning from Airpower's Emergence

DAY 1—AIRPOWER'S FOUNDATIONS

DATE: October 6/7, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Understand the course objectives, course narrative, course syllabus, methods of evaluation, and expectations for seminar.
2. Comprehend the emergence of airpower in World War I and the genesis of the modern USAF core functions and future operating concepts.
3. Assess theoretical frameworks for airpower's effectiveness as well as the value of historical study for airpower professionals.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 500 (S): Airpower's Emergence in World War I

When war broke out in Europe in 1914, heavier-than-air manned flight was barely a decade old and had seen limited military use. Yet it quickly became indispensable, especially on the Western Front. By the war's end, airmen had employed airpower in nearly every role it plays today—though in far more rudimentary forms. Seminar discussions will examine airpower in World War I through the lenses of modern USAF core functions, future operating concepts, and Colin Gray's airpower theory.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

AO 501 (L): Interwar European Airpower (Dr. Richard Muller)

Overview: This lecture explores how major powers responded to the lessons of World War I, building logically on the Day 1 seminar and setting the stage for Day 2. By comparing the aerial services developed by France, Germany, and the Soviet Union during the interwar period—and examining their performance in World War II—the lecture highlights the “paths not taken” by British and American airpower institutions. The interwar period produced no unified conception of airpower, but rather a range of competing ideas and organizational models that were all tested in World War II.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

REQUIRED READINGS (79)

1. Colin Gray, “Airpower Theory,” in *Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd*, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 156-180.
 - a. Students should read each of Gray's 27 dicta for familiarization but should concentrate on D4, D5, D16, and D27 for Day 1 discussion. Guidance for review of other dicta will be provided for subsequent course days.
2. “Air Force Future Operating Concept Executive Summary,” (6 Mar. 2023), 1-2. [\[EL\]](#)
3. John Morrow, “The First World War, 1914-1919,” in *A History of Air Warfare*, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 3-25.
4. David Jordan, “The Royal Air Force and Air/Land Integration in the 100 Days, August-November 1918,” *Air Power Review* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 13-28. [\[EL\]](#)

5. Brian Linn and Brian Donlon, “Learning or Conforming? History and the Military Professional,” *War Room* (7 Dec. 2023), 1-4. [\[EL\]](#)

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-1, *Air Force Standards*, 18 August 2023, 4.
 - a. AFI 1-1 lays out the 5 USAF Core Functions.
2. DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 21 December 2010, 33-34.
 - a. This document further illuminates the functions and expectations of the different services from the DOD’s perspective.

DAY 2—AIRPOWER AS AN EMERGING DOMAIN PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

DATE: October 9/10, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend how the legacies of World War I and the geopolitical, economic, and technological realities/developments of the interwar period influenced airpower organizations, ideas, and capabilities.
2. Assess the various factors that shaped and institutionalized ideas about the effectiveness of airpower during the interwar period.
3. Comprehend political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of World War II that are relevant to understanding airpower's employment in that global conflict.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 502 (S): Interwar Airpower: Preparing for an Uncertain Future

This seminar builds upon the Day 1 lecture and invites students to examine how organizational culture, geopolitical and economic conditions, technology, and cognitive dissonance shaped doctrinal thought and institutional development. During World War I, most airmen agreed that airpower proved most effective when supporting ground operations—particularly through artillery spotting and aerial reconnaissance. Many continued to view support to surface forces as airpower's primary role. However, airpower leaders in Great Britain and the United States increasingly embraced strategic bombardment as the central mission of airpower. Students will compare and contrast interwar airpower perspectives, including the evolution of strategic bombardment theories at the US Army's Air Corps Tactical School. In preparation, students should consider I.B. Holley's analysis of the relationship between technology and military doctrine.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

AO 503 (L): Introduction to World War II (Dr. Paul Springer)

World War II (1939–1945) was the largest global conflict of the twentieth century and a defining turning point in both US and world history. In the six years between the invasion of Poland and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world endured the most destructive war in recorded history. Armed forces totalling more than seventeen million combatants fought across land, air, and sea. This lecture provides essential context for the events leading to the war's outbreak, surveys the major theaters of conflict, and examines the early air war in both Europe and the Pacific.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

REQUIRED READINGS (87)

1. I.B. Holley, *Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 62-70, 87-88. [\[EL\]](#)
2. Phillips Payson O'Brien, *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 97-108.
3. Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1-10 and 128-175.
4. Kwong Chi Man, "Debating 'Douhetism': Competing Airpower Theories in Republican China, 1928-1945," *War in History* 28, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 118-121, 123-131, and 140-142. [\[EL\]](#)
5. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D1-D3, D6-D9, and D25

DAY 3—THE QUEST FOR AIR SUPERIORITY: THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

DATE: October 16/17, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Examine the operational dynamics of the air campaign over Great Britain in the summer and fall of 1940 and how command and control (C2), intelligence, and logistics contributed to British success.
2. Discuss lessons learned from the Battle of Britain regarding the concept of air superiority, Offensive Counterair (OCA), Defensive Counterair (DCA), and planning and assessment guidance.
3. Assess the relevance of the Battle of Britain to current ideas and doctrine regarding counterair operations, including PLA understanding of control of the air.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 504 (S): The Battle of Britain

The Battle of Britain deserves close study by airpower professionals as it remains perhaps the only major example of a successful defensive air campaign in history. Its conduct and outcome offer valuable insights into OCA and DCA operations, as well as the broader concept of control of the air. Seminar discussions will focus on the interplay between air strategy and technology; the impact of leadership; the critical role of planning, intelligence, and assessment; and the evolving nature of air superiority. Students should apply Mark Clodfelter's political and military variables to this and all subsequent case studies to enrich their analysis of airpower effectiveness.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0 hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: The “Big Wing” Controversy

AO 505 (A): Air Superiority Wargaming Discussion Session

Specific instructions will be provided by instructors.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour application.

REQUIRED READINGS (159)

1. Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 211-221.
 - a. Students should find this a useful analytical framework for each case study covered in the course.
2. Richard Overy, *The Battle of Britain: The Myth and Reality* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), all.
3. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, Counterair Operations,” 15 June 2023. [\[EL\]](#)
 - a. Focus on OCA/DCA planning and assessment, 16-24.
4. Derek Solen, “PLA Reconceptualizes Control of the Air,” *China Brief* 23, no. 13 (21 Jul 2023): 10-14. [\[EL\]](#)
5. Gray, “Airpower Theory,” in *Airpower Reborn*, review D11 and D19.

DAY 4—THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER: GENERAL KENNEY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

DATE: October 20/21, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the strategic effectiveness of auxiliary airpower in World War II and the challenges of allocating resources between missions of air superiority, interdiction, and close air support.
2. Assess the conditions that both facilitated and constrained Gen George Kenney's ability to effectively function as Gen Douglas MacArthur's air component commander in the Southwest Pacific.
3. Analyze lessons learned from the Southwest Pacific theater for C2 of airpower, including the Theater Air Control System and recent C2 debates within the PLA.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 506 (S): George Kenney and Auxiliary Airpower in the Southwest Pacific Theater

The air campaign in the Southwest Pacific during World War II remains less well-known than other, more prominent air operations. However, it marked a critical turning point as the United States transitioned from a defensive posture to an offensive push against Japanese expansion. The campaign also set the stage for the rise of General George Kenney, whose success in overcoming significant leadership and operational challenges established him as one of America's most effective and innovative air commanders. While he did not serve as a formal Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), his experience offers important insights into C2 and the evolution of the modern Theater Air Control System—particularly regarding distributed control and decentralized execution. Students will also examine these challenges through the lens of contemporary Chinese military thinking.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: The Leyte Campaign

REQUIRED READINGS (133)

1. Thomas E. Griffith, *MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 42-153.
2. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0.1, Command and Control," 22 January 2025. [\[EL\]](#)
 - a. Focus on the Theater Air Control System and Appendix C: Command and Control Activity Considerations, 31-38, 52-57.
3. LT Jasmin Alsaied, USN, "The People's Liberation Army's Command and Control Affects the Future Out-of-Area Operations," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* 6, no. 3 (March-April 2023): 145-153. [\[EL\]](#)
4. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D12, D13, D15, and D17.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment," 23 August 2022.

DAY 5—STRATEGIC ATTACK IN A CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT: THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

DATE: October 23/24, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze the conduct of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), the adaptations airmen made during the operation, and the CBO's overall effectiveness in facilitating Allied strategy.
2. Understand the CBO's evolution as a series of air campaigns from 1943 to 1945.
3. Evaluate Robert Pape's ideas regarding airpower's effectiveness as a coercive instrument in relation to the CBO.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 507 (S): Bombing Nazi Germany

The strategic air offensive against Nazi Germany remains one of the most complex air campaigns ever conducted—and even 80 years later, its effectiveness continues to spark debate. The US Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) had to adapt rapidly when real-world operations diverged from prewar plans, forcing them to learn in real time. Once they achieved a measure of air superiority, Allied airmen launched a full-scale offensive against German civilian, military, industrial, petroleum, synthetic fuel, and transportation targets. The ongoing debate over the CBO reflects a broader tension that persists today: the relative value of strategic attack versus direct support to surface forces. Robert Pape's theories on airpower and coercion are especially relevant to this case and will be examined further in subsequent sessions.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Option 1: Big Week; Option 2: The Battle of the Atlantic

*****DELIVERABLE DUE: AO-600 (E): AIRPOWER RESEARCH TERM PAPER PROSPECTUS**

REQUIRED READINGS (95)

1. Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1-9, 12-15.
2. O'Brien, *How the War Was Won*, 1-16, 266-307, 316-339, 349-357.
3. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D24.
 - a. Students would also benefit from further review of D11 and D15 for this lesson.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-70, Strategic Attack," 22 November 2021.

DAY 6—COERCION THROUGH AERIAL PUNISHMENT: AIRPOWER AND THE PACIFIC WAR'S ENDGAME

DATE: October 27/28, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze the operational challenges of employing airpower against the Japanese homeland and the effectiveness of the bombing campaign.
2. Evaluate Robert Pape's ideas regarding the punishment-based coercive air strategy and its relevance to historical and contemporary airpower.
3. Comprehend the early Cold War, including the Russian and Chinese challenges to US national interests.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 508 (S): Bombing Imperial Japan

As the war in Europe drew to a close, the conflict in Asia pushed toward a possible amphibious invasion of the Japanese home islands—a campaign expected to bring devastating casualties. This seminar examines the final strategic air offensive of World War II, focusing on how it aimed to achieve coalition objectives while confronting the ethical challenges of strategic bombing in total war—particularly in an era before precision-guided weapons. After discussing the bombing of Japan, students will assess Robert Pape's theories on coercion through aerial punishment. To prepare for seminar, students should use Clodfelter's political and military variables (introduced on Day 3) to consider why the conditions at the end of the Pacific War greatly favored an independent bombing campaign of such intensity.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: The Hump Airlift

AO 509 (L): Strategies of Containment (Dr. Edwin Redman)

This lecture provides an overview of US and Soviet nuclear policy from 1945 to 1962. It examines how national security and military strategy evolved in response to the strategic transformation ushered in by nuclear weapons and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global rival in the two decades following World War II.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

REQUIRED READINGS (64)

1. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 19-27, 59-66.
2. Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 161-186.
3. Ralph H. Nutter, *With the Possum and the Eagle: The Memoir of a Navigator's War over Germany and Japan* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2005), 229-252, 277-283.
4. Joint Publication (JP) 3-84, *Legal Support*, 2 August 2016, II-2 – II-3. [\[EL\]](#)
5. Students would also benefit from further review of Gray, "Airpower Theory," D15 and D24 for this lesson.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, 18 June 2022, A-4 – A-5.
 - a. Introduces the additional principles of restraint, resilience, and legitimacy.

DAY 7—AIRPOWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DATE: October 30/31, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Analyze how the proliferation of increasingly powerful nuclear weapons and delivery systems influenced the USAF's perception of strategic bombardment and its role in US national security.
2. Understand the culture and institutional predominance of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and its impact on American airpower.
3. Understand the origins, course, and outcomes of the Korean War.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 510 (S): Nuclear Weapons and American Airpower from SAC to CNI

The early Cold War brought a dramatic shift in the approach to strategic bombing. During World War II, large bomber fleets delivered vast quantities of conventional munitions against single targets. That basic concept initially carried over after the advent of atomic weapons. However, technological advancements—especially those compressing time—fundamentally altered how airpower could be employed. This session explores the enduring challenges airmen face when integrating new capabilities into existing organizations and doctrinal frameworks, particularly in the context of great power competition. It also asks students to consider how foundational concepts of deterrence developed in the 1950s continue to shape US nuclear policy. Like in the 1950s, the joint force today confronts the challenges of operating in an environment that might entail nuclear usage, drawing attention to the topic of Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI).

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: The Berlin Airlift

AO 511 (L): Overview of the Korean War (Dr. Lisa Beckenbaugh)

This lecture examines the causes, major combat operations, and outcomes of the Korean War, highlighting the key political, diplomatic, and military developments of the period. Students will gain a deeper understanding of how the Korean War fit within the broader context of global strategic competition during the Cold War, while developing a greater appreciation for the realities of ground combat in the conflict.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

REQUIRED READINGS (95)

1. Philip Meilinger, *Bomber: The Formation and Early Years of Strategic Air Command* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2012), 65-79, 92-122, 129-159, 276-282, 311-317. [EL]
2. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations," 18 December 2020, focus on pgs. 1-6 and 20-22. [EL]
 - a. Deterrence remains a primary focus of USAF nuclear doctrine, yet we have recently seen increased interest in CNI planning considerations and continuing joint and combined operations in a post-strike environment.
3. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D18.
 - a. Students would also benefit from further review of D15 and D19 for this lesson.

DAY 8—COUNTERLAND AIR OPERATIONS: AIRPOWER IN THE KOREAN WAR

DATE: November 3/4 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the influence of the grand strategy of containment, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the emergence of limited geopolitical crises and wars on the employment of airpower in the Korean War.
2. Identify the technological, organizational, and command and control challenges that the newly-established USAF confronted in the Korean War and evaluate its success in innovating and adapting to overcome them, particularly through close air support (CAS) and air interdiction.
3. Evaluate Robert Pape's ideas regarding the denial-based coercive air strategy and its relevance to historical and contemporary airpower.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 512 (S): Airpower in Limited War: The US Air Force in the Korean War

As the US Air Force increasingly focused on developing its nuclear capabilities, it was suddenly drawn into a conventional conflict where strategic airpower struggled to achieve national political objectives. While capable of delivering significant destruction, strategic airpower found few viable targets in a largely unindustrialized North Korea, especially amid prolonged ground stalemates. China's vested interest in North Korea—and its eventual intervention—further constrained American airpower options. The gap between strategic airpower's capabilities and the limitations imposed by national policy forced airpower leaders to confront the challenge of crafting an effective strategy for a limited war. This session asks: What lessons does the Korean War offer twenty-first-century airmen facing similar dilemmas in today's strategic competition? Further, it examines the role of airpower in counterland air operations. Students should revisit Clodfelter's political and military variables to analyze the Korean War, the USAF's first limited war.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: The PLAAF in the Korean War

AO 513 (A): Counterland Air Operations Application

Specific instructions will be provided by instructors.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour application.

REQUIRED READINGS (117)

1. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 69-79.
2. Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2020), 1-9, 40-92, 155-184.
3. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-03, Counterland Operations," 31 October 2024, 20-37. [\[EL\]](#)
4. Students would also benefit from further review of Gray, "Airpower Theory," D15 and D17 for this lesson.

Phase II: Confronting Problems from Airpower's Recent Past, Present, and Future

DAY 9—AIRPOWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE VIETNAM WARS

DATE: November 6/7, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Compare and contrast French and American approaches to airpower in irregular warfare in Southeast Asia.
2. Analyze airpower's utility as a military instrument in limited wars and largely irregular conflicts.
3. Assess how airpower theory, organizational culture, and doctrine impact airpower employment in irregular wars.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 514 (S): French and American Airpower in Vietnam

The Vietnam Wars were fundamentally irregular conflicts, marked by a blend of counterinsurgency operations and combat against conventional forces employing hybrid warfare strategies. France fought for nearly a decade to retain its colonial hold on Indochina, ultimately suffering a decisive defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Minh waged a people's revolutionary war designed to overcome Western technological superiority and will to fight. The United States initially supported France's war effort as part of its broader Cold War strategy. After France's withdrawal, the United States deepened its involvement in an attempt to preserve a non-Communist South Vietnam. The US Air Force, with its institutional emphasis on nuclear deterrence and strategic bombardment, struggled to define its role in this environment. Over time, it adapted to the challenges of irregular warfare and introduced several innovative airpower applications. Despite these efforts, airpower failed to stabilize South Vietnam or deter North Vietnamese aggression. By 1965, the United States escalated its commitment by launching a more intensive air campaign and deploying a larger ground force presence.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Option 1: British Airpower in the Malayan Emergency; Option 2: Battle of the Ia Drang Valley

REQUIRED READINGS (107)

1. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 1-10, 139-161, 225-274, 423-439.
2. Michael Weaver, *The Air War in Vietnam* (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2022), 11-20.
3. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D9.

DAY 10—COERCION THROUGH AERIAL RISK STRATEGIES: OPERATIONS ROLLING THUNDER AND LINEBACKER II

DATE: November 10/14, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the political and grand strategic factors that accounted for changing approaches to strategic bombing between the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations during the US air war in Vietnam.
2. Evaluate the strategic effectiveness of Operations ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER II.
3. Evaluate Robert Pape's ideas regarding the risk-based coercive air strategy and its relevance to historical and contemporary airpower.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 515 (S): Air Coercion and Interdiction in Vietnam

Even as US involvement in South Vietnam deepened after France's withdrawal, the US Air Force remained primarily focused on preparing for general nuclear war. However, irregular conflicts demanded different capabilities—such as CAS, air mobility, and advising allied forces—that fell outside the Air Force's traditional focus. Over time, it provided increasingly effective support to ground forces. Yet the USAF's focus remained on the aerial coercion and interdiction campaigns such as ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER II. Despite tactical successes, the broader war strategy failed to address the root causes of the insurgency or prevent the enemy from building a resilient and capable organization. The collapse of South Vietnamese forces following the US withdrawal in 1972 highlights persistent challenges in foreign military training and support—challenges that, in many respects, parallel those faced during the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Vietnam War remains highly informative as the United States supports allies and partners in strategic competition.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Lam Son 719

AO 516 (L): Airpower in Global Conflicts, 1945-1991 (Dr. John Terino)

Beyond the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, airpower went through important technological and doctrinal developments in conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli Wars. This lecture explores the technological dimensions of airpower's global transformation, including the development of IADS, the rise of stealth, and precision-guided munitions, among other technologies.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture on Friday, 14 November for all students to deconflict with NS Day 10 lecture on 10 November

REQUIRED READINGS (83)

1. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 28-29, 66-69.
2. Weaver, *The Air War in Vietnam*, 255-312, 386-406.
3. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D10.
 - a. Students would also benefit from further review of Gray, "Airpower Theory," D15 and D16 for this lesson.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-03, Counterland Operations," 31 October 2024.

2. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-70, Strategic Attack,” 22 November 2021.

DAY 11—FORGING MODERN AMERICAN AIRPOWER AFTER VIETNAM

DATE: November 17/18, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the long-term effects of the Vietnam War on the US Air Force and the overarching effectiveness of US military reforms in the 1970s and 1980s.
2. Evaluate the argument that a training revolution drove a paradigm shift in American airpower and the USAF way of war.
3. Assess the effectiveness of adapting American airpower for a new security environment during the later Cold War.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 517 (S): Reinventing the USAF Way of War

Brian Laslie's *The Air Force Way of War* supports a discussion of the Air Force's operational focus following the Vietnam War and its alignment with national security priorities of the time. In the post-Vietnam era, the US military increasingly concentrated on the prospect of a Soviet invasion of Central Europe, which it viewed as the primary national security threat. Students should evaluate whether the Air Force drew the right lessons from the Vietnam War. Consider how the development of Red Flag exercises and superior aircraft—had they occurred earlier—might have influenced the war's outcome. Would such innovations have improved operational effectiveness or altered strategic results? These questions underscore the complexity of the post-Vietnam period and the Air Force's ongoing struggle to align tactical and operational improvements with broader strategic objectives during a shifting phase of the Cold War. Further, students should discuss Laslie's understanding of the USAF way of war and its relevance in the current security environment.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Option 1: Operation EAGLE CLAW; Option 2: Airpower in the Falklands War

REQUIRED READINGS (112)

1. Brian D Laslie, *The Air Force Way of War: US Tactics and Training after Vietnam* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 1-112.
2. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D22.

DAY 12—AIRPOWER’S MOMENT: OPERATION DESERT STORM (ODS)

DATE: November 20/21, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend how America’s victory in 1991 validated the institutional path taken by the US military since the end of the Vietnam War.
2. Assess the effectiveness of independent and auxiliary airpower in ODS.
3. Evaluate Robert Pape’s ideas regarding the decapitation-based coercive air strategy and its relevance to historical and contemporary airpower.
4. Complete an Air Operations Center exercise related to ODS to gain familiarization with aspects of the Joint Planning Process for Air and the Joint Air Tasking Cycle.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 518 (S): Airpower Effectiveness in ODS and its Implications for Joint Warfare

This seminar follows logically from the discussion of USAF reforms after Vietnam. It examines how effectively the 1991 air war aligned operational success with meaningful national security outcomes. Operation DESERT STORM tested the Department of Defense’s newly established joint structures and procedures in a major conflict for the first time. Given the widespread praise for the air campaign, students should critically assess how well airpower contributed to achieving national objectives. The discussion will explore competing narratives about airpower’s strategic effectiveness in the war, encouraging students to evaluate both its immediate impact and its longer-term implications for US military strategy. Seminar discussion will also examine ODS from the perspective of counterair operations, specifically for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), and OCA/DCA execution considerations.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Scud Hunting in ODS

AO 519 (A): Air Operations Center Exercise 1

Specific instructions will be provided by instructors.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour application.

REQUIRED READINGS (110)

1. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 79-86.
2. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 75-122, 178-202.
3. John Andreas Olsen, “Operation Desert Storm, 1991,” in *A History of Air Warfare*, 177-200.
4. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, Counterair Operations,” 15 June 2023. [\[EL\]](#)
 - a. Focus on SEAD, IAMD, and OCA/DCA execution considerations, pages 4-7, 25-29.
5. Gray, “Airpower Theory,” in *Airpower Reborn*, review D23.

DAY 13—VICTORY FROM THE AIR? OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (OAF)

DATE: December 1/2, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Evaluate the claim that airpower demonstrated its promise to produce decisive strategic outcomes on its own in OAF.
2. Comprehend airpower's employment in OAF and how it advanced the USAF way of war.
3. Assess John Warden's response to Robert Pape's ideas regarding airpower as a coercive instrument.
4. Complete an Air Operations Center exercise related to OAF to gain familiarization with aspects of the Joint Planning Process for Air and the Joint Air Tasking Cycle.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 520 (S): Airpower Effectiveness in OAF and its Implications for Strategic Attack

The readings for this seminar prompt critical discussion about the strategic and operational effectiveness of the 1999 bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. The legacy of Operation ALLIED FORCE remains more complex and contested than that of DESERT STORM. While many airmen view the Kosovo campaign as a validation of airpower's capacity to achieve decisive results independently, others dispute this interpretation. Students will evaluate the operational and strategic outcomes of the Balkan campaign and consider its implications for airpower's role in securing meaningful national security objectives in the context of strategic competition. Moreover, OAF influenced both Russia and China to reassess their relationships with the West, reinforcing their focus on external threats and accelerating military modernization efforts. Students will read John Warden's response to Robert Pape's *Bombing to Win* in preparation for this seminar. Since Warden's article predates OAF, the campaign offers a valuable case study for evaluating the validity of his claims in light of actual outcomes.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Operation DELIBERATE FORCE

AO 521 (A): Air Operations Center Exercise 2

Specific instructions will be provided by instructors.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour application.

REQUIRED READINGS (105)

1. John Warden, "Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's *Bombing to Win*," *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (1997): 172-190. [\[EL\]](#)
2. Benjamin Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 1-86.

DAY 14—INNOVATION OR STAGNATION? AIRPOWER IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

DATE: December 4/5, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Assess the relative effectiveness of airpower in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).
2. Examine the relevance of airpower in conflicts where kinetic solutions, while often alluring, may undermine the broader strategic objective of protecting the population and maintaining its political loyalty.
3. Evaluate the extent to which “remote warfare” and a more advanced reconnaissance-strike complex has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of airpower in modern conflicts.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 522 (S): Airpower Case Studies in Afghanistan and Iraq

This seminar examines the case studies of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Although the major combat phases in Afghanistan and Iraq initially resembled conventional state-on-state warfare, both were markedly asymmetric conflicts. By 2008, coalition forces had shifted focus to stability operations and counterinsurgency efforts, presenting a distinct set of challenges for airpower. Students will compare and contrast these conflicts with the Vietnam War, analyzing the capabilities and limitations of airpower in achieving national security objectives in counterinsurgency environments.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

Airpower Staff Ride Topic: Option 1: Tora Bora; Option 2: Afghanistan Withdrawal

REQUIRED READINGS (92)

1. Benjamin Lambeth, “Operation Enduring Freedom,” in *A History of Air Warfare*, 255-277.
2. Heather Venable, “The Result is Never Final: Operation Iraqi Freedom,” in *Air Power in the Age of Primacy: Air Warfare since the Cold War*, eds. Phil Haun, Colin F. Jackson, and Timothy P. Schultz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 121-147. [\[EL\]](#)
3. Phil Haun, “Air Power in the Age of Primacy,” in *Air Power in the Age of Primacy: Air Warfare since the Cold War*, 7-20. [\[EL\]](#)
4. Timothy P. Schultz, “Remote Warfare: A New Architecture of Air Power,” in *Air Power in the Age of Primacy: Air Warfare since the Cold War*, 26-53. [\[EL\]](#)
5. Gray, “Airpower Theory,” in *Airpower Reborn*, review D21.
 - a. Students would also benefit from further review of D17 for this lesson.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 2-0, Intelligence,” 17 March 2025.
2. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-60, Targeting,” 12 November 2021.

DAY 15—CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN AIRPOWER: OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR)

DATE: December 8/9, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Understand the challenges and opportunities airpower faced in OIR and compare them to previous conflicts.
2. Analyze the performance of Russian airpower in OIR and its implications for strategic competition.
3. Apply insights from OIR to emerging challenges for future warfare, especially considering coalition operations.
4. Complete an Air Operations Center exercise related to OIR to gain familiarization with aspects of the Joint Planning Process for Air and the Joint Air Tasking Cycle.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 523 (S): Airpower in OIR

This seminar analyzes key lessons from Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and their relevance to strategic competition. It compares airpower employment in OIR with other recent conflicts and considers the operational challenges encountered. Drawing on students' experiences with OIR, discussions aim to sharpen critical thinking for future operations—particularly as the United States focuses on strategic competition and great power conflict, which present both significant challenges and opportunities. Although OIR ultimately achieved its objectives, the air campaign provoked debate regarding airpower's optimal role. Benjamin Lambeth contends that overly restrictive rules of engagement and a misreading of ISIS's character constrained airpower's early effectiveness. A subsequent RAND report offers a more nuanced assessment, qualifying Lambeth's claims and highlighting additional lessons learned.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0 hour seminar

AO 524 (A): Air Operations Center Exercise 3

Specific instructions will be provided by instructors.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0 hour application.

REQUIRED READINGS (84)

1. Benjamin Lambeth, "American and NATO Airpower Applied: From Deny Flight to Inherent Resolve," in *Airpower Applied: US, NATO, and Israeli Combat Experience*, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 180-204.
2. Becca Wasser, et al, *The Air War Against the Islamic State: The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), 1-12, 79-86, 293-308. [\[EL\]](#)
3. Ralph Shield, "Russia's Air War Win in Syria," in *Air Power in the Age of Primacy: Air Warfare since the Cold War*, 229-254. [\[EL\]](#)

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 2-0, Intelligence," 17 March 2025.
2. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-60, Targeting," 12 November 2021.
3. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine

Publication 3-52, Airspace Control,” 31 December 2021.

DAY 16—AIR DOMINANCE DENIED? AIRPOWER FACES AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

DATE: December 11/12, 2025

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Understand how technology and the changing security environment might require adapting the USAF way of war.
2. Evaluate claims regarding air denial, the air littoral, and air superiority.
3. Comprehend trends in Chinese airpower through an analysis of PLA air, space, and missile forces.
4. Evaluate challenges facing airpower in a predominately maritime environment like the Indo-Pacific.

LESSON OVERVIEW

AO 525 (S): The Future of Airpower and Air Warfare

This seminar concludes the Airpower Strategy and Operations course with a capstone discussion on the future of the US Air Force and American/coalition airpower amid the challenges posed by the pacing threat. Some scholars argue that the USAF's traditional concept of air superiority may be less applicable in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict. Others maintain that air superiority remains essential, as demonstrated by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Students will examine these perspectives in light of their comprehensive study of airpower history, theory, doctrine, and strategy.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour seminar

***DELIVERABLE DUE: AO-601 (E): AIRPOWER RESEARCH TERM PAPER

REQUIRED READINGS (92)

1. Kelly A. Grieco and Maximilian K. Bremer, "Contesting the Air Littoral," *Aether* 3, no. 3 (Fall 2024): 10-24. [\[EL\]](#)
2. Michael P. Kreuzer, "Beyond Air Superiority: The Growing Air Littoral and Twenty-First Century Airpower," *Aether* 3, no. 3 (Fall 2024): 40-52. [\[EL\]](#)
3. Grant Georgulis, "Drone Hype and Airpower Amnesia," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, 25 July 2025, all. [\[EL\]](#)
4. Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), *PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China's Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces*, 4th Edition (22 July 2024), 1-26, 37-47, 66-77. [\[EL\]](#)
5. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-04, Countersea Operations," 20 September 2023. [\[EL\]](#)
 - a. Focus on Naval Warfighter Perspective and Air Force Missions in Countersea Operations, pages 1-12.
6. Gray, "Airpower Theory," in *Airpower Reborn*, review D9, D11, D14, and D20.

RELATED SERVICE AND/OR JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, Counterair Operations," 15 June 2023, 1-6.
2. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Air Operations*, 28 April 2025, I-1 – I-2.
 - a. For both the AFDP and JP, students should focus on the doctrinal discussion of control of the air and the air domain.